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1 
 
 The Party in Time 
 
Jonathan White (LSE) 
 
 
Trends of falling membership and support spell a time of crisis for political parties, possibly of transformation.  
Dilemmas of principle arise: should partisans revise their normative commitments in whatever way garners new 
supporters, or would that be to sell their party’s soul?  The article investigates this as a problem of 
intergenerational obligation, examining what consideration, if any, partisans owe their party’s past and future.  It 
seeks to show the limits of conceiving partisanship as a ‘presentist’ activity, legitimately governed exclusively by the 
concerns of the present generation, and argues it must include some notion of showing loyalty to the actions of 
predecessors and advancing the prospects of those to come.  Two corresponding norms of ethical partisanship – 
fidelity and sustainability – are outlined and discussed.  The article’s goal is to refine our concept of what a party 
is, and in so doing contribute to a broader ethics of activism.   
 
 
 
Membership of an association, be it a state, family or ethnic group, is often said to bring with it a 
distinct set of obligations.*  In the case of a political party, as typically a voluntary organisation, 
that there should be such obligations may seem self-evident.  To commit to a cause is to make 
collective projects one’s own, something that necessarily involves a measure of self-restraint and 
sacrifice.  Yet the extent of such obligations – to whom or what they are owed, and how 
constraining their demands should be – is less clear.  For some, the obligations specific to the 
partisan may be quite limited, along the lines of a duty of loyalty to those immediate colleagues 
whose political fortunes they share.  For others they will be rather more extensive, entailing a 
commitment to some larger community of the like-minded, extended in space and time.  The 
obligations incumbent on partisans, independent of those they may incur as citizens or in other 
social roles, can be sketched in contrasting ways. 
Existing treatments of partisan obligation generally approach it as a special case of political 
obligation.
1
  A core concern is how partisan conflict can be made compatible with a liberal order: 
                                                          
* The article significantly benefitted from the feedback of Geoff Brennan, John Dryzek, Dimitris Efthymiou, Nic 
Southwood, Fabio Wolkenstein and Lea Ypi, as well as participants of the Moral, Social and Political Theory Seminar 
at the Australian National University (ANU), four referees of this Journal and its Editor.  The research was facilitated 
by a visiting fellowship at ANU’s School of Philosophy, and a fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin funded 
by the EURIAS programme. 
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 The major recent works on partisanship are Rosenblum 2008 and Muirhead 2014.  See also Portis, Gundersen & 
Shively 2000; specifically on partisan obligation, see Bonotti 2012. 
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questions of tolerance, free speech, and the scope for civil disobedience are to the fore, with the 
emphasis therefore on what partisans owe to those beyond their own circle – to their political 
opponents and the wider political community.  Rarer is a focus on what partisans, as members of a 
collective, owe their fellow members of the party.  Some of the essential elements such an ethics of 
partisanship might cover have been highlighted in the occasional work on intra-party deliberation, 
participation, and respect for dissenting opinion.
2
  I want to introduce a different dimension, 
concerning what partisans owe their fellows in respect of their party’s past and future.  This is a 
distinct area of partisan ethics, centred on the party’s evolution in time.  Guided by an idea of 
partisanship as directed to the advancing of a long-term political project, I propose to explore the 
nature of partisan ties by approaching them as a question of intergenerational obligation. 
Thinking about partisanship in this time-sensitive fashion is important if we are to fully 
understand, critically appraise, perhaps even respond to, some of the key political trends of 
contemporary western democracy.  For many parties, recent years have seen declining rates of 
membership and increasingly uncertain voter support.  Where once labour parties might have hoped 
to count on the stable allegiance of a working class, and conservative parties on that of the moneyed 
and propertied, today things seem more unsettled.  What political scientists call processes of ‘de-
alignment’3 have left parties needing to adapt if they are to survive.  One of the ways they have 
done so is by making fundamental revisions to party doctrine, in some cases changing their 
constitution to do so.  This was the route the Third Way parties of the 1990s chose, severing 
themselves from much of their socialist traditions in the name of modernisation.
4
  Conservative and 
centrist parties have seen parallel shifts, described with such terms as ‘neo-conservatism’ and ‘neo-
liberalism’. 
                                                          
2
 Muirhead 2014, 2006; Teorell 1999. 
3
 Dalton and Wattenberg 2000. 
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 On the case of the British Labour Party and its revision of Clause IV of the party constitution in 1995, see below.  For 
the German SPD, the birth of the Neue Mitte is generally dated to the months following the party’s arrival in 
government in 1998. 
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Such parties are heavily criticised from within for disowning the commitments they once 
stood for.  An effort to shore up party support has been widely viewed as an exercise in ‘selling 
out’.  Yet the same critical attitude has appeared to others as a form of dogmatism.  Mature politics, 
it is suggested, involves revising one’s commitments as the electorate evolves.  Parties must keep 
up with the times.  At stake in these disputes are the parameters within which any process of 
partisan re-definition may legitimately unfold.  This in turn reflects, I suggest, how one draws the 
contours of partisan obligation.  Decisions to re-orient a party inevitably put the actions of 
predecessors and successors in a new light; the question is how much this matters.  The pressing 
strategic decisions facing many parties today have thus brought a particular dimension of partisan 
ethics to the fore.   
In the ethics of political community more broadly, questions of cross-temporal obligation 
have been usefully approached by distinguishing backward- and forward-looking perspectives.
5
  
This distinction can be applied to the present enquiry.  In the first category, one might ask how far 
partisans have an obligation to remain faithful to the convictions of preceding partisans.  Does 
membership of an organisation extended in time, with an established history and an unbounded 
future, introduce constraints on the scope for legitimate political reinvention?  Or should one 
emphasise the autonomy of today’s members – the ‘sovereignty of the living generation’?  In the 
second category – the forward-looking perspective – one may ask whether the partisans of the 
present have obligations concerning their party’s future.  Might one talk of a duty to balance short-
term gains such as electoral success against the party’s long-term organisational and programmatic 
sustainability?  How far, in short, should one conceive partisan obligations as extending cross-
temporally? 
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 See e.g. Gosseries & Meyer 2009. 
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I begin with an examination of what might be called the ‘presentist’ view of the party, in 
which obligations connected to the party’s past and future are absent.  In such a perspective, a party 
is correctly understood as an association of individuals whose mutual obligations, such that they 
are, are independent of the party’s history and long-term trajectory.  I argue this view is 
problematic, partly because it downplays one of the sources of a party’s public credibility – its 
constancy of programme – but more crucially because it is in tension with one of the good reasons 
individuals may have to associate with a party: the commitment to a political project whose full 
realisation necessarily lies in the long term, perhaps beyond the human lifespan.  Partisanship finds 
one of its strongest rationales in the idea of the party as a cross-temporal collective whose members’ 
efforts cumulate across time.   Insofar as partisans ought to respect the good reasons for which their 
fellow partisans may associate with the party, they should not be indifferent to the party’s coherence 
across time.  The article goes on to explore the merits of an alternative account in which partisans 
do have cross-temporal obligations, both ‘ascending’ ones addressed to the past and ‘descending’ 
ones addressed to the future.  I sketch how the attendant obligations might look, outlining two 
norms of fidelity and sustainability.  Such obligations need not always trump countervailing 
concerns: they apply in a context in which other citizen obligations continue to hold, and sometimes 
the demands of the latter will be judged superior.  But these obligations should be recognised, I 
argue, as one element in the moral calculus of partisanship.
6
 
Thinking about group obligation is one way to explore the nature of the group.  The article’s 
primary goal is to refine our concept of what a party is, offering a corrective to those accounts that 
cast it as but a network of office-seeking individuals.  A richer conception is needed if one is to 
grasp the stakes of contemporary partisan crisis and transformation, and make a critical evaluation 
of the strategies adopted by contemporary political elites.  More widely, the article seeks to develop 
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5 
 
one branch of an ethics of activism.  The political party, broadly understood, has been one of the 
paradigmatic forms of political involvement in the modern age, and arguably still represents an 
important source of desirable change.  If its progressive potential is to be realised, reflection on the 
moral basis of the demands it makes seems important.  In particular, in a period when real-world 
social and political movements often display an ephemeral quality, emerging and receding at some 
speed, it seems important to reflect on the activist’s position in time.  
 
 
I.  Sovereignty of the Living Generation?  Presentist Conceptions of the Party 
 
I shall call the presentist conception of the party the view that holds that partisans, as partisans, 
have no meaningful cross-temporal obligations.  By ‘partisans’ I understand those who claim unity 
in the name of a shared conception of the public good and how best to realise it (a normative 
programme, as I call it), and who participate in coordinated activities designed to bring this 
interpretation to bear on authoritative political decision-making.
7
  Provisionally, for simplicity, I 
shall refer only to those who are party members in the formal sense, though later I shall touch on the 
more ambiguous case of those who are consistent supporters without being formal members 
(‘partisans beyond the party’, as one might call them).8   
In this presentist view, partisans have no reason to feel constrained in their decisions by 
concerns arising from how these decisions relate to the party’s past.  Nor need they make special 
allowance for the party’s future, insofar as this is separable from their own immediate fortunes and 
the fortunes of the wider public on whose behalf they act.  They have full discretion to discard or 
                                                          
7
 Cf. White & Ypi 2011; White 2014.  This definition emphasises a claim to unity: I assume this unity will often be 
imperfect, and that parties will tend to display diversity of ideas and disagreement.  I do not exclude, moreover, that 
these disagreements may be beneficial to parties, so long as the claim to unity prevails. 
8
 Cf. Bonotti 2012. 
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retain the existing normative programme as they fit, and full discretion to discount the party’s long-
term prospects in favour of its short-term success, construed as electoral popularity, policy impact, 
or whatever else.  They are unencumbered by cross-temporal partisan obligations.  Borrowing a 
term used in eighteenth-century debates on the desirability of binding state constitutions, we might 
summarise this view as endorsing ‘the sovereignty of the living generation’.9 
Such a position can be found in what is sometimes called the economic view of the party, 
which conceives it as a network of elites seeking to maximise personal advantage.  The view has 
been popular in the study of parties, within and beyond the rational-choice tradition.  In this 
perspective, the party is conceived compatibly with the definition above, but with the additional 
proposition that the guiding motive of action is individual utility-maximisation.
10
  Partisans are 
conceived as office-seekers, their decisions led principally by a concern for what will be electorally 
popular amongst a population of voters in the moving present.  Although an argument against 
intergenerational obligation is rarely made explicit by adherents to this view, the focus on electoral 
measures of partisan success, which entail a numerically determinate population of voters 
comprised of those living at a given moment, implies a model of partisan rationality in which cross-
temporal concerns are largely absent. 
That partisans oriented only to immediate success will lose public credibility over time is a 
point supporters of this view may freely concede.
11
  If the world to which normative programmes 
are addressed is at all stable, what partisans advocate today and tomorrow ought to bear some 
resemblance, else their actions become too unpredictable to be meaningfully endorsed.  Constancy 
of message is important, such authors will accept, even if partisanship is ultimately about nothing 
more than efficiency at winning power.  This might be seen as a concession to the importance of 
cross-temporal demands – to the need for the ideal partisan to bring tomorrow’s voters into their 
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 Jefferson 1975 [1798]. 
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 Downs 1957a, p.142. 
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calculus alongside today’s.  But the argument turns on strategy rather than ethics.  In this line of 
reasoning, in which voter behaviour is the ultimate measure of good (that is, effective) partisanship, 
cross-temporal thinking only becomes important to the extent that it helps to win votes.  The 
implication is that if voters are willing to endorse radical ruptures in programme, constancy of 
message does not matter.  In other words, this concern with political credibility reflects merely an 
expectation of what kind of partisan strategy is likely to be successful.  It is not derived from an 
assessment of what configuration of obligations is constitutive of partisanship.  No intrinsic value is 
attached to the effort to harmonise present-day partisan actions with those of past and future. 
I foreground the economic view because it is a familiar one in the study of partisanship, but 
presentist conceptions need not take this form.  A less utility-oriented account is possible, whereby 
partisans have other-regarding goals, yet full discretion to pursue them as they see fit, unburdened 
by backward- and forward-looking partisan considerations.  In the Jeffersonian reasoning against 
perpetual state constitutions, the sovereignty of the living generation is of course necessary not so as 
to liberate decision-makers to pursue selfish interests but so as to prevent their being constrained by 
commitments not of their own making.
12
  Similar arguments might be developed for the party, such 
that present-day partisans are said to be able to pursue their normative programme adequately only 
if their hands are not tied by the commitments and prospects of those of another time.  It is their 
judgement which is thus privileged, not their interests narrowly understood.  Such a view amounts 
to an enlightened presentism, for it is compatible with the intention to pursue the interests of a wider 
constituency.  It is, however, in one important respect similar to the outlook previously described: 
no intrinsic value is placed on seeking to align present-day partisan actions with those of yesterday 
and tomorrow. 
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 Jefferson 1975 [1798].  His remarks relate primarily to the transfer of debt, but are sufficiently generalised at the end 
of the letter to bear on the present case. 
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I want to contest this position without simply referring to the questionable credibility 
amongst voters that presentism may or may not entail.  The major limitation of a presentist 
perspective lies, I suggest, in its discordance with the good reasons for which an individual might 
choose to associate with a party in the first place.   
Whatever their political orientation, one of the important rationales available to individuals 
to motivate their involvement in partisan activity is, I suggest, the idea of helping to advance the 
kinds of normative ideal that require coordinated effort over time.  Justice, equality, fairness, 
freedom, democracy, national development, conservation – while small victories that favour these 
ends can be aimed at in the short to medium term, they resist immediate satisfaction in anything like 
their entirety.  Those who commit themselves to a party defined by such goals, though they may set 
themselves more achievable, less high-minded goals also, ultimately commit themselves to goals 
which cannot be fully realised within a single electoral cycle, a single period of office, a single 
political career, or indeed the individual lifespan.
13
  They commit themselves to projects that require 
time for their implementation, and that cannot be tackled on the relatively short timescale of a 
political mandate.   The value of the party lies in the way its extended lifespan makes the pursuit of 
these long-term projects possible.  Borrowing terminology from existing discussions of 
intergenerational justice, we might say that the party represents a distinctive means to address 
‘lifetime-transcending interests’.14  It provides an opportunity for those associated with it both to 
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 Party scholars sometimes distinguish ‘material’ incentives for party affiliation (to do with rewards of income, power 
or career opportunity) from ‘solidary’ ones (to do with opportunities for the formation of social ties) and ‘purposive’ 
ones (to do with the advancement of political goals) (Ware 1996, chap. 2; Bruter & Harrison 2009, pp.33ff.).  My 
interest here is on the last of these, which is generally considered the most prominent in contemporary partisanship 
(certainly amongst European parties – Ware 1996; cf. Bruter & Harrison 2009, pp.18ff. on ‘moral-minded’ members – 
but seemingly in North America too – cf. Young & Cross 2002).  Elements of the second incentive (‘solidary’) may 
also be present in the idea of the party as a cross-temporal project, insofar as this carries communitarian implications 
and may be one source of the sense of collective identity traditionally connected to party membership.   
14
 Thompson 2002; Thompson in Gosseries & Meyer 2009. 
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contribute to an ongoing, cumulative project and, less instrumentally and more expressively, to 
align themselves publicly with the ideas that inspire it.
15
   
To be sure, for some individuals, personal power and prestige may be sufficient reasons to 
associate with a party, as the economic conception suggests.  But while this may be an adequate 
motivation for some – particularly for those with realistic prospects of achieving a position of 
leadership within the party – for others it will be quite implausible.16  Many partisans – especially 
those affiliated to large parties – may not be in a position to justify their involvement in terms of 
interest-maximisation, since they may gain little in strictly material terms.  Economic theories of the 
party generally have little to say about what brings the ordinary partisan on board – yet without 
them there is no party.
17
   Nor can an enlightened presentism adequately be the source of their 
allegiance.  Those who take other-regarding commitments seriously and wish to shape institutions 
to reflect them must reckon with the fact that to realise goals through the political process demands 
patient efforts extended in time.  Even in its more modest forms, partisanship is a protracted 
business, not least because political institutions themselves – the procedures of election, legislation, 
execution, and so on – have their own distinctive tempo to follow.  Moreover, ongoing partisan 
dedication is required so that political achievements, once attained, are maintained.  Those who join 
a party expecting immediate and lasting results will typically be soon disappointed.  If their 
involvement is to be meaningful, objectively and subjectively, an alternative rationale for 
association is needed: the idea of commitment to an ongoing collective project provides this. 
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 For studies of such motivations in the British Labour and Conservative parties, see Whiteley & Seyd 1992; Whiteley 
et al 1994. 
16
 That ‘rank-and-file’ partisans may be motivated less by interest and more by principle is a point long observed: see 
Hume ([1748] 1998), essay 8, ‘Of the Parties of Great Britain’, p.41: ‘Thus Court and Country, which are the genuine 
offspring of the British government, are a kind of mixed parties, and are influenced both by principle and by interest.  
The heads of the factions are commonly most governed by the latter motive; the inferior members of them by the 
former.’  The point appears in comparative politics as ‘May’s Law’: see May 1973. 
17
 The economic model arguably relies tacitly on a substrate of non-utilitarian motivations.  Cf. Whiteley et al. 1994, 
chap. 4. 
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Here one gets the first glimpse of a possible theory of partisan cross-temporal obligation, 
though it is not my aim to develop it in detail yet.  If the idea of the party as advancing a 
cumulative, cross-temporal project provides a strong rationale for engaging in partisanship, then 
arguably this motivation deserves some form of respect, for it is the quid pro quo of the sacrifice 
and self-restraint that partisanship demands.  As partisans seek to influence the course of their party, 
they should not be indifferent to the commitments of predecessors, whose efforts were crucial to the 
party’s development and whose contributions find their meaning in the belief they will be 
continued.  Partisans failing to show due respect for this motivation would be abusing the efforts of 
their fellow members, reaping the benefits of these efforts without acknowledging that which gives 
them their sense and coherence.  
Cross-temporal concerns of this kind, it should be added, seem to form part of the self-
understanding of partisans themselves.  Moments of crisis in particular are a revealing site for the 
study of normative expectations.  In the case of parties, notions of the intrinsic importance of 
constancy of normative programme are disclosed in those moments when a sub-grouping of the 
party sharply deviates from past practice.  As noted, many are the party leaders in modern 
democracy who have been accused by large sections of their membership of having ‘betrayed’ their 
party’s origins, ‘sacrificed’ its traditions, or ‘sold its soul’.18  Such denunciations of broken 
commitments evoke the party as something larger than its living individuals – as part of an ongoing 
political project – and suggest the intrinsic worth of remaining faithful, one way or another, to the 
party’s earlier incarnations.19  Nor are such ideas the preserve of a particular species of party.  
While the notion of commitment to a long-term normative project might seem to fit parties of the 
                                                          
18
 In addition to the Third-Way examples mentioned, see e.g. the disputes in the 1950s in the German SPD concerning 
the Bad Godesberg programme (Lösche and Walter 1992, pp.110ff.; Potthoff and Miller 2002, pp.208ff); for the 
extreme case of Fidesz in Hungary, a party moving from left to right: Enyedi 2005.  For an interesting political 
intervention seeking to capitalise on such expectations at the expense of another party, see Miliband 2010.   
19
 By contrast, in an association identical to its founding members (and thus without a history older than the present 
generation), such denunciations of broken tradition would sound odd. 
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Left in particular, as those historically oriented to social progress and ongoing struggle as the 
condition of its realisation, parties of the Centre and Right have by no means been immune to such 
concerns.  Empirical observation reveals plenty of denunciations of betrayal here too.
20
  Even those 
parties that go under the heading ‘conservative’ generally set themselves some kind of ongoing 
project – e.g. the restoration of a good society deemed to have decayed – and rarely cast themselves 
purely in the role of a rearguard action to defend the status quo.  
In sum, if the unity of a party is grounded as I have suggested in shared political 
commitments, affiliation to it should be possible in terms of the goals it professes.  Given these 
goals are generally of a long-term character, this possibility rests on the ongoing cooperation of 
other partisans, acting in such a way as to make cumulative moves towards those objectives 
possible.  Further, the wider contribution of partisanship to democracy arguably rests in part on 
partisans having exactly such long-term goals, thereby establishing a systematic connection 
between political ideals and institutional decision-making.
21
  It is because the notion of partisanship 
as about a cross-temporal project is one of the most plausible rationales for partisan practice, as well 
as one apparently evident in the intuitions of partisans themselves, that it should form the basis for a 
more detailed exploration of partisan cross-temporal obligation. 
 
 
II.  Partisan ascending obligations: on a norm of fidelity 
 
Reflections on intergenerational justice sometimes distinguish between ascending and descending 
obligations, that is, between obligations to predecessors and successors.
22
  The distinction can 
usefully be applied when thinking about the ethics of partisanship, and is adopted in this section and 
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 On debates led by Erwin Teufel in the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), see White 2013. 
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 White & Ypi 2010. 
22
 E.g. Gosseries in Gosseries & Meyer 2009. 
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the next to offer an account of how cross-temporal partisan obligations might look.  My goal is to 
identify a core set of obligations that help illuminate some of the essentials of partisan ethics.  The 
discussion is necessarily selective: additional obligations could very possibly be included, not least 
because the details of a party’s ideological profile may generate obligations specific to partisans of 
that persuasion.
23
     
Before we begin, notice that to speak of obligations to predecessors and successors is to 
formulate matters in interpersonal terms, as ties to people rather than to institutions, traditions or 
values.  One of the merits of this formulation is that it accords with the ‘person-affecting intuition’, 
whereby we assume that right or wrong acts, and the obligations that correspond to them, are such 
according to the positive or negative effects they have on persons.
24
  If decisions affecting the 
course of a party are to be measured to some kind of normative standard, one would expect it to 
have something to do with how these decisions affect people (in the case in question, fellow 
partisans).  By contrast, depersonalised obligation has a fundamentalist ring, suggesting an 
unbounded enthusiasm for ‘the idea’.25  To detach commitments from the persons they are shared 
and advanced with is to risk becoming deaf to the human costs that arise in their pursuit. 
But to speak of obligations to predecessors and successors, rather than disembodied 
traditions, raises the challenging prospect of obligations to the dead and the unborn.
26
  Especially 
the possibility of the former may seem dubious.
27
  If someone no longer exists, what benefit or 
harm can be done them?  Does their unawareness of later events not make them inviolable, and does 
                                                          
23
 There are some which I have chosen not to discuss which might be widely agreed upon, e.g. an obligation not to 
slander individuals.  While significant, these are not central to the article’s focus on evolving normative programmes. 
24
 Parfit 1984, pp.370-1. 
25
 The point is made by Georg Simmel in his classic contribution to the social theory of conflict: (Simmel 1904, p.511). 
26
 But note: on a narrower reading, predecessors and successors can be construed as those older, living partisans who 
were most active with the party in an earlier phase of its history, and those living partisans-to-be currently involved for 
instance with the party’s youth movement.  The argument advanced over the following sections is compatible with this 
more modest reading of fidelity and sustainability.    
27
 On problems to do with the latter, see the following section. 
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this not place them beyond the scope of a theory of obligation?
28
  That the dead might be harmed by 
the living is implied, of course, by some common intuitions, notably that an injury is done when a 
person is posthumously slandered.  That they are ignorant of the deed seems weak grounds on 
which to discount it.  Of direct relevance to the argument that follows is the more general 
proposition, maintained in a substantial strand of moral philosophy, that the dead can be harmed or 
benefitted according to how far their deeply-held concerns are promoted after their death.
29
  In this 
perspective, the fortunes of the dead, properly considered, are inseparable from the later trajectory 
of things dear to them – their children for instance, or the activities to which they dedicated 
themselves in life.
30
  Their stake in these matters is ongoing, and how such concerns unfold after 
their deaths is germane to the degree of fulfilment that can be attributed to their lives.  This 
fulfilment, argues Pitcher, is not reducible to a conscious state of happiness or satisfaction: a life 
can be compromised by developments of which the individual is unaware, and by extension it can 
be compromised by events which take place after its conclusion.
31
  In the case of partisans, one may 
suppose a deeply-held concern of the sort that bears on such fulfilment is the fate of the political 
project they choose to commit to.  Whether the party prospers in a recognisable form is an 
important aspect of their self-realisation.  This is the sense in which their welfare is dependent on 
the party’s subsequent trajectory, and how they fall therefore within the purview of a theory of 
obligation. 
Let us look more closely then at the first set of obligations to be considered: those of the 
backward-looking, ‘ascending’ kind.  I have argued that a long-standing and coherent reason to be a 
partisan has been to contribute to the advance of ‘lifetime-transcending interests’.  Included in this 
rationale for partisanship is, I suggest, an expectation that tomorrow’s partisans will seek to act in a 
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 Cf. Feinberg 1980, p.173. 
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 Ridge 2003, esp. pp.42ff.; Pitcher 1984; Feinberg 1980, pp.174ff. 
30
 Pitcher 1984, p.184. 
31
 Cf. Pitcher 1984; Feinberg 1980, pp.64-6, p.175; O’Neill 1993, p.36. 
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way broadly consistent with the efforts of today’s.  Given that the fruits of these efforts will be 
deferred, and dependent for their realisation, partial or complete, on the labours of those to come, 
these activities are likely to derive much of their value for those engaged from the belief they will 
be continued, and certainly not discontinued or flouted arbitrarily.  Partisanship may be classed as a 
‘future-oriented’ practice in this sense.32  As such, it may be said to generate obligations amongst 
present-day partisans to show respect to the actions of their predecessors, and to give sense to the 
future-oriented spirit in which these were conducted.
33
  This is what is intended by the above-
mentioned norm of fidelity. 
In the most obvious sense, fidelity might be taken to imply an obligation to act in strict 
accordance with the traditions of the party as established by its founding partisans.  It can be read as 
the effort to adhere as far as possible to the inherited normative programme.  In many parties the 
fundaments of this programme are laid out in a constitutional text.
34
  Such a text can be understood 
as the founders’ effort to embed certain long-term commitments at the party’s core.  It is this text, 
one might argue, that authoritatively reveals their future-oriented projects and those of all partisans 
who choose to associate with the party over the course of its subsequent development.  Fidelity to 
predecessors in this view means fidelity to the constitutional text. 
Yet while strict conformity with a founding document is clearly a form of fidelity, such an 
interpretation is not without problems.  First, it is liable to produce a rather static conception of the 
party in which partisans are condemned to ‘live in the past’.  It reserves partisanship for the 
dogmatic, understood as those unwilling to revise commitments in response to changing empirical 
circumstances.  Second, one intuitively senses that it overstates the claim of past activists to set the 
course followed by their successors.  The future-oriented actions of the dead or retired seem to 
achieve an unjustified dominance over the future-oriented actions of the presently engaged.  While 
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a presumption of constancy in commitment seems plausible, strict conformity itself is too 
demanding.  If this marks a reductive understanding of fidelity, what could be meant by it instead? 
Rather than an obligation to avoid innovation at all costs, I interpret fidelity to mean an 
obligation to justify it and to pursue it incrementally.  It amounts to a requirement to show, in 
convincing fashion, how new initiatives connect in some minimally coherent way to the traditions 
from which they depart, and to explain why their elements of novelty are needed.  To better 
understand what this norm might entail, we may first set out the general criteria that might guide 
such a process of justification, before looking at an empirical case that clarifies their application in 
practice. 
On this account of fidelity, deviations from past practice ought (1) to be the subject of 
partisan debate.  They should be overt initiatives, openly weighed by fellow partisans rather than 
privately promoted by a faction.  It is a minimum condition of holding predecessors in respect that 
their commitments be challenged openly rather than covertly, else their claim on the party’s course 
is ignored.  Beyond this basic requirement, we may hold that where departures from past practice 
are sought, these should (2) be credibly presented as building upon existing elements of the partisan 
tradition, not marking a wholesale rupture.  Links to the commitments of predecessors ought to be 
visible, with innovations presented as reinterpretations of values shared by past and present 
partisans alike, or as extensions of older commitments into new domains.  That innovations do not 
undermine broad swathes of existing commitments, even if they necessarily marginalise some, 
ought to be demonstrated.  When it is proposed that Commitment X replace Commitment Y, it 
should be shown this is compatible with the continued pursuit of Commitments A, B, C.  This 
holds, in addition to commitments traceable to the party’s founding text, to those more recently 
affirmed in major documents such as manifestos.
35
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A further criterion we may stipulate is (3) that the necessity of such innovations should be 
properly accounted for.  Short-term electoral popularity, or some general notion of change for 
change’s sake, are weak grounds on which to compromise a party’s constancy of programme.  
Where shifts in the party’s direction are sought, these should be grounded in an analysis of how far-
reaching changes in the wider society render certain commitments outmoded.  To the extent that 
adaptations of programme can be convincingly related to societal change, the break with tradition 
leaves intact the rationality of partisan predecessors as they pursued their projects in a different 
social context, and indicates why the party must proceed in ways they could not have foreseen.
36
  
To illustrate how such considerations might play out in practice, it is useful to observe a 
concrete case at some critical moments.  Perhaps no party history better illuminates the claims of 
fidelity than that of British Labour, a party of long traditions that has been subject more than once 
to pressures for a redefinition of its programme.  In the two most prominent instances, the central 
question has concerned the party’s commitment to public ownership in the economy.  Clause IV of 
its 1918 constitution committed the party to seeking ‘the common ownership of the means of 
production, distribution and exchange’.  First under the leadership of Gaitskell in the years 1959-60, 
then under Blair in the years 1994-5, and both times in the context of electoral defeat, there were 
moves to revise this commitment.  Each was a genuinely revisionist effort, designed to detach the 
party from a significant strand of its orthodox views.
37
   
How do these initatives match up against the fidelity criteria described?  Was the norm 
adhered to in practice?  To their credit, both Gaitskell and Blair were quite open about the acts of 
redefinition they were proposing.  In line with point (1), their initiatives were overt, publicly 
                                                          
36
 The importance of observing these criteria increases, one may add, in proportion to the scale of the changes proposed. 
37
 On the emergence of this orthodoxy with the 1918 constitution, and its reproduction in the decades thereafter in major 
party documents, see Jones 2005, pp.18ff.  As the author notes, that there is an identifiable orthodoxy does not mean the 
party’s tradition is not composed of plural strands.  Party traditions resemble in this way the ideological traditions they 
draw on: Freeden’s account of ideologies in terms of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts that can be rearranged in 
diverse ways captures well this bounded pluralism (Freeden 1996, pp.77ff.).   
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announced at a party conference and much debated before a decision was made.
38
  Furthermore, 
broadly consistent with (2), both involved efforts by the advocates of change to show how the 
innovations proposed were continuous with the party’s traditions.  A distinction was made between 
the means and the ends to which the party was committed: public ownership, argued the 
revisionists, was but the contextually-appropriate means to advance the underlying goals of equality 
and social welfare, which now needed to be pursued by other means.
39
  To be sure, in Blair’s case, 
the continuity was thinner – partisans in 1995 were being asked to embrace the principle of private 
ownership and competition, whereas in 1960 they were being asked simply to consider exceptions 
to the rule of public ownership.
40
  Arguably the later shift risked emptying the Labour tradition of 
its coherence; it was also combined with open disparaging of large chunks of the party’s past.  But 
still, we may say, some effort to show continuity with the past was evident.
41
   
Where the experiences significantly diverged was in regard to criterion (3), concerning the 
depth of analysis deployed to justify change. Gaitskell’s initiatve was underpinned by a 
comprehensive account of societal transformation, developed by intellectuals such as Crosland and 
widely disseminated in party literature, that sought to explain why public ownership no longer 
deserved the emphasis it had been granted in 1918.
42
  The initiative was also accompanied by clear 
arguments for where the party should be going.  Blair’s proposal, by contrast, lacked anything like 
this intellectual support.  The main texts, such that they were, emerged in the years following.  Also 
vaguer was the alternative that Labour partisans were to consider.  Rather than on a principled case 
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for change, the burden of persuasion fell largely on data from polling and focus groups, and the 
prospect of further electoral defeats.
43
  These failings of justification were all the more problematic, 
one may add, given the break with party tradition was to be all the more far-reaching in this case.    
The norm of fidelity thus looks to have been fairly well served in the earlier phase of Labour 
revisionism, less so in the later one.  In the former case an arguably modest break with the party’s 
past was argued for with precision, in a way that upheld the rationality of what partisan 
predecessors had been seeking to achieve in an earlier societal context.  In the latter case, a more 
radical break with the party’s tradition was argued for loosely, and often with the explicit 
denigration of ‘Old Labour’ partisans.  While both initiatives were revisionist, one displayed 
noticeably more appreciation than the other for the projects of partisans past.  
Or at any rate, this is how it appears from the outside.  The plausibility of revisionist claims 
is of course ultimately something for the assessment of partisans themselves.  Partly a matter of 
individual judgement, it is also something for which, in any given party, institutional mechanisms 
are foreseeable as a means to guide evaluation and give voice to partisans past.  While the party 
constitution is an obvious reference-point for establishing the party’s core commitments, along with 
past manifestos and salient policy statements, such texts require interpretation.  A deeper 
institutionalisation of the norm of fidelity might involve a party establishing a council of partisans, 
separate from the leadership, whose members act as authoritative interpreters of the tradition.  Their 
role would be to engage in judicial-style reasoning concerning the meaning of the constitution, 
subsequent interpretations of it, and the kinds of precedent established by departures from it.
44
   
 To conclude: the trajectory of any party will legitimately include elements of rupture as well 
as continuity.  There will always be ways in which real-world conditions have changed 
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unforeseeably such that significant departures in programme are necessary.  Sometimes the goals of 
yesteryear will genuinely need to be pursued by different means; sometimes individual ends 
themselves, or their relative significance, may need to be reassessed.  An obligation of fidelity 
nonetheless implies real constraints on how the partisans of the present may define and promote 
their normative programmes.  It hitches a burden of justification to revisionist initiatives, and 
renders suspect the kind of opportunist strategy that seeks immediate popularity without regard for 
the party’s longer-term past.45   
 
 
III. Partisan descending obligations: on a norm of sustainability 
 
If partisans have ascending obligations, can one identify a corresponding set of descending 
obligations?  Partisans, it may be said, have a duty to preserve the conditions in which the just-
described process can continue into the future.  For if G2 has obligations to G1 and its predecessors, 
G1 in turn has an obligation to bequeath to G2 the circumstances in which it can feasibly discharge 
its obligations to G1 and its predecessors, insofar as G1 has the power to do this.
46
  This is an 
ethical – as opposed to merely prudential – demand, for it is a condition of partisan successors being 
in a position to continue to pursue the projects of their predecessors.  Specifically, partisans can be 
said to have a duty to preserve the conditions in which future partisans can draw on a tradition and 
credibly present themselves as connected to it.  This obligation I propose to examine under the 
heading of a norm of sustainability.  
                                                          
45
 These constraints are real unless one assumes yesterday’s partisans would endorse whatever it takes for their 
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How might this be interpreted?  Clearly the transfer of material resources is likely to be one 
component.  Without the basic foundation of sound party finances and a reasonable membership 
base, the ongoing viability of the party is in question.  Just as important however is the party’s 
endurance in an ideational rather than organisational sense, something which depends on the 
transfer of symbolic and intellectual resources.  Future partisans will require a meaningful set of 
concepts and related vocabulary with which to articulate and continue a normative programme, and 
the visible public profile and good reputation needed to promote it.   
This can be approached as a problem of conservation and depletion.  One might speak for 
instance of a partisan obligation to avoid using the core concepts of the party’s ideological tradition 
in contradictory ways such that their meaning is hollowed.  Such a stipulation would exclude what 
political observers call ‘cross-dressing’, whereby party elites seek the short-term approval of a 
certain group of voters (or to de-mobilise those that might support competing parties) by making 
themselves ideologically indistinguishable from their opponents.
47
  Such moves make it more 
difficult for their partisan successors to stake out a distinctive position and convincingly present 
themselves as part of an enduring political tradition.  Rather than as members of a cross-temporal 
political project, they risk appearing as nothing but a collection of self-interested individuals, using 
political language for instrumental purposes rather than to express sincerely held commitments.   
A related obligation concerns the influence partisans of the present may have on the wider 
political culture beyond their party.  The sustainability of their partisanship depends on a culture in 
which the idea of principled disagreement between competing political views is readily accepted.  
In the absence of such a culture, future partisans are likely to struggle to promote the political 
projects they set themselves to the general public: their ideals will fall on deaf ears.  An obligation 
to uphold such a culture might entail for instance a responsibility not to deny the reality of political 
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disagreement with adversaries, or cast it in merely technical terms when it concerns ends as well as 
means – temptations to which Third Way parties were famously prone.48  The disavowal of 
principled differences in the present is liable to make critical perspectives harder for future 
participants in the democratic process to articulate.  Succeeding partisans become more likely to 
struggle ineffectually. 
Questions of organisation and leadership are also central to a party’s sustainability.  
Partisans who allow their party to be dominated by a single individual, though they may boost its 
fortunes in the short term by drawing on personal charisma, put its longer-term prospects in doubt.  
Not only does individual domination risk displacing programmatic commitments with the politics of 
personality, but it leaves the party closely tied to the individual’s reputation – and easily tarnished 
with it.
49
  Problems of leadership succession are also accentuated in such cases.  (The British 
Conservatives under Thatcher would be one case in point.)  It is for such reasons that historically 
some of the party leaderships to have left the strongest legacy for their successors have been 
relatively collegial in structure.
50
  Absolute command has not been sought, or it has been restrained 
by the efforts of partisan peers.  In an increasingly mediatised environment, and especially in 
presidential systems, elements of personalisation are inescapable.
51
  But they can be amplified or 
contained.  Rarely are they indispensable to a party’s success.52  For partisan successors, the legacy 
of dispersed authority is likely to be more solid than that of one-person rule. 
These are some of the important ways partisans may be said to have obligations to seek the 
sustainability of their practices.   
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It may be wondered whether there is still not something problematic about the notion that 
future partisans can be harmed by the actions of their predecessors.  If later generations encounter 
the party in a sufficiently adequate state that they wish to associate with it, this is reasonable 
evidence, it might be said, that their predecessors did not behave irresponsibly.  The enduring 
willingness to affiliate is evidence that no harm was done.  Alternatively, where earlier generations 
do behave irresponsibly and the party loses its appeal to would-be partisans, again it may be said 
that no harm was done, for the successors who might raise a complaint do not exist.  Plausible as it 
may sound, this challenge is too dichotomous.  It must be expected that a party will continue to 
attract partisans even in a compromised state, due to its still representing the best option available 
for those of a certain political persuasion.  (Alternative parties may be wholly unpalatable, and the 
costs of establishing a new party high.)  For these partisans still drawn to the party, the task they 
face is made more arduous by their party’s diminished condition.  As a class then, even if not as 
determinate individuals, future partisans can be left with stronger or weaker prospects, according to 
the condition in which the party is transferred.
53
  Decisions made in the present will predictably 
affect the challenges that succeeding partisans must face.  
Furthermore, the obligations associated with a norm of sustainability, though directed 
towards future partisans, also connect to partisans of the past and present.  Sustainability is the 
condition of respect being accorded by present-day partisans to the future-oriented actions of their 
predecessors and peers, since these actions gain their meaning from the reasonable expectation they 
will be advanced not just by one particular generation (the present one) but also by others 
continuing into a more distant future.  Consequently, while such a norm is geared to the welfare of 
partisans-to-be in its concern that the point of departure for their projects be favourable, it aims also 
to protect the future-oriented projects of those who came before.
54
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It remains the case that sometimes considerations of fidelity and sustainability may clash, or 
(purely on the descending side) that there may be a tension between preserving the party as a 
coherent normative unity and ensuring its material survival.  It is not difficult to imagine occasions 
when there is a tension between consistency of programme and the party’s material prosperity as an 
organisation, even its survival.
55
  But to acknowledge such clashes is already to grant the reality of 
cross-temporal considerations.  How they are then to be weighed is a matter for situated judgement. 
 
 
IV.  Objections 
 
In these final paragraphs, let me examine a cluster of objections to the article’s argument.  First, it 
may be asked whether the obligations I have described, to the extent that they are embraced by the 
partisan, are not liable to divert from the fulfilment of competing obligations, e.g. to the political 
community as a whole.  If, for example, a party of government can save lives by shifting policy in a 
way that breaches fidelity, should its partisans not override their cross-temporal obligations without 
hesitation?  One can imagine various states of emergency in which this might apply (leaving aside 
the fact that in such scenarios a norm of fidelity may equally be a useful source of orientation).  
Likewise, what about the party that consistently pursues immoral ends?  Are the members of a party 
with racist traditions not morally obliged to seek as clean a rupture with the party’s past as possible, 
if not the dissolution of the party?  In such cases a norm of fidelity would seem simply an 
impediment to civic virtue.
56
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Clearly there is a difference between sketching these obligations at a general level and 
identifying their force in the particular instance.  It has not been the article’s argument that partisan 
cross-temporal obligations necessarily trump countervailing concerns, but rather that they should be 
recognised as one element in the moral calculus.  Ceteris paribus they hold force, but there will be 
occasions when they are outweighed by competing concerns.
57
  Discharging an obligation will not 
always be the right thing to do, but it is a consideration to take seriously as part of the deliberative 
process that seeks to establish what the right thing to do may be.
58
   
In the case of a persistent tension between norms – as in the case of the racist party – one 
might prefer to see cross-temporal obligations as not merely outweighed but dissolved.  F.W. de 
Klerk was, one might argue, under no obligation whatsoever to be faithful to the traditions of the 
South African National Party, nor to seek to advance the sustainability of his party.  No trace of 
blame – as a breach of obligation might imply – should be attached to the rupture in policy he 
heralded.  Although it is tempting in this way to limit the idea of cross-temporal obligation to what 
one might call ‘respectable’ parties, I prefer to see these obligations as existent but persistently 
outweighed in such parties.
59
  Without contextual knowledge, one should note, it is unclear that the 
good of the polity is necessarily better served by the breach of cross-temporal partisan obligations 
rather than by their observance and thus the persistence of the party in a form which makes it and its 
ideas a visible target of condemnation.  
A second, related challenge to the argument resembles the first in inverted form.  Cross-
temporal obligations are generally trivial, it may be said, destined not so much to distract from 
competing obligations as to pale beside them (not to mention the temptations of power and 
prestige).  The claims of predecessors and successors will never be sufficiently strong to deflect 
partisans from what other kinds of obligation require them to do.  Here one is being asked to 
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consider whether partisan cross-temporal obligations are really sufficiently consequential to be 
weighed at all. 
It is by no means clear that such obligations will always be trivial.  There may be occasions 
when competing obligations balance each other, or when it is uncertain what actions they prescribe.  
In such cases, considerations to do with fidelity and sustainability may tip the balance in favour of 
one course of action over another.
60
  They may be decisive, in other words, even when they are not 
the most crucial considerations in play.   
Furthermore, even obligations that are rarely decisive may still be worthy of recognition.  
Those that the article has sought to describe retain significance even if weakly observed and rarely a 
sufficient guide to action.  They introduce an additional source of pressure on the partisan to justify 
their normative position, in particular to say how specific commitments square with one another and 
with others previously held, also to explain why a given party is the most appropriate means to 
pursue certain goals.  These obligations also offer a resource by which fellow partisans and the 
wider citizenry can hold their leaders to account.  A celebrated thesis in the study of partisanship 
holds that party elites have a tendency to separate themselves from the rest of the party 
membership, pursuing a distinct set of interests and thereby undermining the normative 
programme.
61
  The idea of cross-temporal partisan obligations offers an important corrective 
mechanism, an ideal standard against which to assess decision-making and with which to counter 
the tendencies of an elite to retreat into a self-referential world.  It offers a basis on which to 
integrate the party around the commitments claimed as the basis of its unity.  It further may 
cultivate reasonable scepticism, amongst the partisans of a given party and amongst unaligned 
citizens more generally, towards the celebration of novelty, or cognate processes such as 
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‘modernisation’, as goods in themselves, without need of further justification.62  Thus even in a 
merely negative fashion, in the form of the denunciation of breach, the obligations we have 
examined may be considered significant in various respects. 
It might still be argued that the account I have presented is too constricting for partisans 
themselves.  The concern is perhaps not that the standards of fidelity and sustainability force them 
into the role of the conservative: after all, the normative programmes advanced with greatest 
constancy over time may well be amongst the most politically radical.  But what space does this 
account preserve for their independence of mind and critical capacity?  Are they not condemned to 
an unthinking role, habitually seeking continuity with their party’s past?  It needs emphasise that 
where individuals wish to break decisively with existing commitments they retain the option to exit 
their party.  They can renounce the larger part of their partisan obligations and revert at least 
temporarily to the status of non-partisan citizens, perhaps before founding a new party.
63
  This is 
one way that radical novelty of thought and practice can find expression, notwithstanding the 
significant institutional barriers that may impede it.
64
  That obligations may be repudiated in the 
exceptional moment does not nullify their force under normal conditions.   
To be sure, under imperfect institutional conditions it is not easy to found a successful new 
party.  If the electoral system makes it difficult for small parties to gain representation in the 
legislature (e.g. because there are thresholds of minimum support), new parties will need to work 
hard to establish themselves.  Institutions can be redesigned to strengthen proportionality, but only 
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under certain conditions.
65
  Launching a new party is likely to be an option of last resort, 
challenging to exercise and of uncertain outcome.
66
  But it remains an important possibility.  And 
even were it true that the chances for major innovation lay exclusively within the confines of 
existing parties, a norm of fidelity might still carry force, albeit in an attenuated form: as the 
obligation to publicise the extent of a party’s transformation, e.g. by surrendering the symbols that 
evoke its continuity, including its name and its imagery.  Such an act of separation would ensure 
revisionist partisans do not unfairly benefit from a misleading association with the endeavours of 
their predecessors, and would insulate the actions of the latter from the doctrinal shifts that might 
distort their original meaning.  It would further leave intact the identity of the older tradition for a 
later set of partisans to reconnect to. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The article has argued for a conception of the political party that includes cross-temporal partisan 
obligations.  It has sought to show how these are implied by the good reasons for which ordinary 
partisans may join the party, and the nature of the goals parties define themselves by.  Meaningful 
partisanship, it has been suggested, relies on the idea of the party as advancing an ongoing project.  
The obligations that ensue take both ascending and descending forms, corresponding to what I have 
called norms of fidelity and sustainability respectively.    
In the parties of contemporary western democracies, elites are frequently denounced 
precisely for having reneged on such obligations.  In the post-Cold War period especially, partisan 
traditions are said to have been neglected or systematically undermined by leaders at the helm of a 
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wide range of parties, both Left and Right, often in tandem with the celebration of a politics of 
pragmatism which makes the reactivation of such traditions by future partisans ever harder.  This is 
one way to understand the nature of those ‘cartel parties’ which scholars in comparative politics tell 
us are increasingly common.
67
  The maintenance of meaningful divisions of opinion between parties 
would seem to depend in large part on the extent to which cross-temporal obligations of the kind 
described are observed.  Partisans that breach such obligations are liable to end up looking rather 
alike, tempted to collude rather than criticise.  Perhaps one should not be surprised that these 
developments coincide with declining rates of party membership.  While there is no mono-causal 
explanation to be given, one may wonder whether this does not stem at least in part from the good 
reasons to join a party being nullified by those partisan elites who show little awareness of cross-
temporal obligation.  Parties with no discernible past and future convey little sense that they stand 
for something.  Elites who act as though a presentist conception of the party were adequate 
contribute to the decline of existing parties: the model is an unstable one.   
Perhaps in the same instant that they weaken existing organisations, these transgressions 
make a contribution, however modest, to the renewal of the partisan idea.  To put it in Durkheimian 
terms, they offend the partisan conscience collective, and by provoking denunciation they give this 
ethos new visibility.  Converting this into a productive source of pressure on decision-making is 
likely to depend on the strengthening of intra-party institutions that can authoritatively interpret a 
party’s foundational commitments, and combining these with mechanisms for intra-party 
deliberation such that the kinds of norm we have examined can be compellingly invoked in party 
debate. 
Those who celebrate spontaneous movements as an alternative to party commitment 
apparently believe a more episodic form of political engagement can adequately stand in for one 
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founded on long-term projects – or at least that it is the next best thing.  My remarks on the party in 
time indicate some of the questions to be asked of these competing modes of engagement.  What 
kinds of rationale do they rely on, and how far can these be detached from notions of commitment 
to a cumulative project?  Are social movements so different from parties in their ethical basis?  Can 
there be genuine solidarity in the absence of cross-temporal obligation?  A wider ethics of activism 
would need to engage with such questions.   
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